40 research outputs found
On the Structure of Equilibria in Basic Network Formation
We study network connection games where the nodes of a network perform edge
swaps in order to improve their communication costs. For the model proposed by
Alon et al. (2010), in which the selfish cost of a node is the sum of all
shortest path distances to the other nodes, we use the probabilistic method to
provide a new, structural characterization of equilibrium graphs. We show how
to use this characterization in order to prove upper bounds on the diameter of
equilibrium graphs in terms of the size of the largest -vicinity (defined as
the the set of vertices within distance from a vertex), for any
and in terms of the number of edges, thus settling positively a conjecture of
Alon et al. in the cases of graphs of large -vicinity size (including graphs
of large maximum degree) and of graphs which are dense enough.
Next, we present a new swap-based network creation game, in which selfish
costs depend on the immediate neighborhood of each node; in particular, the
profit of a node is defined as the sum of the degrees of its neighbors. We
prove that, in contrast to the previous model, this network creation game
admits an exact potential, and also that any equilibrium graph contains an
induced star. The existence of the potential function is exploited in order to
show that an equilibrium can be reached in expected polynomial time even in the
case where nodes can only acquire limited knowledge concerning non-neighboring
nodes.Comment: 11 pages, 4 figure
Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local
We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of
communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central
position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model
(Fabrikant et al., PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the
Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game
was first studied only recently (Bil\`o et al., SPAA'14), where a worst case
locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms
of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic
view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their
local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the
best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of
computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria.
Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy-changes.
Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case
locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with
observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on
the price of anarchy.Comment: An extended abstract of this paper has been accepted for publication
in the proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Mathematical
Foundations on Computer Scienc
Greedy Selfish Network Creation
We introduce and analyze greedy equilibria (GE) for the well-known model of
selfish network creation by Fabrikant et al.[PODC'03]. GE are interesting for
two reasons: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth
adaptations over radical strategy-changes, (2) GE are outcomes found by agents
which do not have enough computational resources to play optimally. In the
model of Fabrikant et al. agents correspond to Internet Service Providers which
buy network links to improve their quality of network usage. It is known that
computing a best response in this model is NP-hard. Hence, poly-time agents are
likely not to play optimally. But how good are networks created by such agents?
We answer this question for very simple agents. Quite surprisingly, naive
greedy play suffices to create remarkably stable networks. Specifically, we
show that in the SUM version, where agents attempt to minimize their average
distance to all other agents, GE capture Nash equilibria (NE) on trees and that
any GE is in 3-approximate NE on general networks. For the latter we also
provide a lower bound of 3/2 on the approximation ratio. For the MAX version,
where agents attempt to minimize their maximum distance, we show that any
GE-star is in 2-approximate NE and any GE-tree having larger diameter is in
6/5-approximate NE. Both bounds are tight. We contrast these positive results
by providing a linear lower bound on the approximation ratio for the MAX
version on general networks in GE. This result implies a locality gap of
for the metric min-max facility location problem, where n is the
number of clients.Comment: 28 pages, 8 figures. An extended abstract of this work was accepted
at WINE'1
Selfish Network Creation with Non-Uniform Edge Cost
Network creation games investigate complex networks from a game-theoretic
point of view. Based on the original model by Fabrikant et al. [PODC'03] many
variants have been introduced. However, almost all versions have the drawback
that edges are treated uniformly, i.e. every edge has the same cost and that
this common parameter heavily influences the outcomes and the analysis of these
games.
We propose and analyze simple and natural parameter-free network creation
games with non-uniform edge cost. Our models are inspired by social networks
where the cost of forming a link is proportional to the popularity of the
targeted node. Besides results on the complexity of computing a best response
and on various properties of the sequential versions, we show that the most
general version of our model has constant Price of Anarchy. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first proof of a constant Price of Anarchy for any
network creation game.Comment: To appear at SAGT'1
On Coloring Resilient Graphs
We introduce a new notion of resilience for constraint satisfaction problems,
with the goal of more precisely determining the boundary between NP-hardness
and the existence of efficient algorithms for resilient instances. In
particular, we study -resiliently -colorable graphs, which are those
-colorable graphs that remain -colorable even after the addition of any
new edges. We prove lower bounds on the NP-hardness of coloring resiliently
colorable graphs, and provide an algorithm that colors sufficiently resilient
graphs. We also analyze the corresponding notion of resilience for -SAT.
This notion of resilience suggests an array of open questions for graph
coloring and other combinatorial problems.Comment: Appearing in MFCS 201
The Max-Distance Network Creation Game on General Host Graphs
In this paper we study a generalization of the classic \emph{network creation game} to the scenario in which the players sit on a given arbitrary \emph{host graph}, which constraints the set of edges a player can activate at a cost of each. This finds its motivations in the physical limitations one can have in constructing links in the practice, and it has been studied in the past only when the routing cost component of a player is given by the sum of distances to all the other nodes. Here, we focus on another popular routing cost, namely that which takes into account for each player its \emph{maximum} distance to any other player. For this version of the game, we first analyze some of its computational and dynamic aspects, and then we address the problem of understanding the structure of associated pure Nash equilibria. To this respect, we show that the corresponding price of anarchy (PoA) is fairly bad, even for several basic classes of host graphs. More precisely, we first exhibit a lower bound of for any . Notice that this implies a counter-intuitive lower bound of for the case (i.e., edges can be activated for free). Then, we show that when the host graph is restricted to be either -regular (for any constant ), or a 2-dimensional grid, the PoA is still , which is proven to be tight for . On the positive side, if , we show the PoA is . Finally, in the meaningful practical case in which the host graph is very sparse (i.e., , with ), we prove that the PoA is , for any
Reconstructing a simple polygon from its angles
We study the problem of reconstructing a simple polygon from angles measured at the vertices of the polygon. We assume that at each vertex, a sensing device returns the sequence of angles between each pair of vertices that are visible. We prove that the sequence of angle measurements at all vertices of a simple polygon in cyclic order uniquely determines the polygon up to similarity. Furthermore, we propose an algorithm that reconstructs the polygon from this information in polynomial time
A polygon is determined by its angles
AbstractWe study the problem of reconstructing a simple polygon from angles measured at the vertices of the polygon. We assume that at each vertex v a sensing device returns a list of angles α1,α2,…, where αi is the angle between the i-th and the (i+1)-th vertices visible to v in counterclockwise (ccw) order starting with the ccw neighbor of v along the boundary. We prove that the angle measurements at all vertices of a simple polygon together with the order of the vertices along the boundary uniquely determine the polygon (up to similarity). In addition, we give an algorithm for reconstructing the polygon from this information in polynomial time